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Baltic States and the Euro: A Spectral Analysis of the 2007 
Financial Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The robustness of a fixed exchange rate system is a function of credibility (de Grauwe 
2003). Credibility emerges when the commitment to maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate is demonstrated tangibly. The Baltic States have initiated policies aimed at 
acceding to the European single currency or ‘Euroizing’. Under convergence criteria, 
to Euroize legally governments should peg their exchange rates with the Euro within a 
system known as ERMII for at least two years and fulfil other conditions. The 
convergence period leaves these small economies exposed for a window of time that 
may or may not be benign. Van Poeck et al. (2007) find that membership of the 
ERMII can increase the vulnerability to a speculative attack. By contrast, De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2002) and De Grauwe (2003) argue that because of self-imposed costs 
of reneging on the commitment to ERMII membership, the likelihood of an exchange 
rate crisis is lower. The impact and transmission of a crisis may vary with the type of 
regime. Fischer (2001) posits that ‘soft’ peg exchange rates are not sustainable. 
Would a crisis undermine convergence? 
The Bank of England (2008) marks 9th August 2007, when BNP Paribus 
suspended three sub-prime money market funds and the European Central Bank 
injecting €95bn to boost liquidity in the European banking sector, as the beginnings of 
the banking turbulence. The analysis undertaken here focuses on the exchange rates of 
the Baltic States and the Euro. Specifically, although they resisted, were these ERMII 
currencies put under more pressure to devalue as a result of the banking crisis that 
began in August 2007? It is hypothesised that the Baltic States would be subject to 
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adverse speculation in a non-benign era whilst in the window of convergence, putting 
pressure on the pegged rates, leading to greater divergence from central rates. The 
paper covers the year before (the benign period), and the year after (the contagious 
period). This year captures the banking crisis that became evident in the US and 
Western Europe in 2007 (the event) but concludes before the Lehman Bros. collapse, 
so covering a ‘small shock’ period.  
The paper is compiled as follows. In the second section, there is a discussion 
of currency arrangements in the Baltic States. This is followed by a review contagion 
and literature concerning financial contagion over numerous crises. Next, there is an 
outline of the background or setting of the study. The subsequent sections review the 
data and the methods. The results reveal that, unexpectedly, the currencies appear to 
follow the Euro at least as closely and perhaps more so, following the event. It is 
concluded that there is contagion between the Euro and the three currencies. This 
contagion appears favourable for a fixed currency regime and this is unaffected by the 
type of regime. However, phase spectra support a view that banking links, which are 
not affected by the currency regime, may have transmitted a crisis to the Baltic States.  
2. Baltic States 
 
The IMF (2004) classifies the range of fixed exchange rate alternatives. To maintain a 
credible fixed exchange rate, the central bank would accommodate the excess demand 
or excess supply of its currency by intervening in the foreign exchange or money 
markets to neutralise, as it were, the excess. Some latitude is exercised in the 
immediacy of the response and the degree of neutralisation. With ERMII membership 
Lithuanian and Estonian currencies were required to be within a ±15% band with the 
Euro. Lithuania and Estonia operate a currency board system, which results in a 
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degree of latitude of practically zero. Although it aims to have sufficient reserves to 
cover domestic money, Latvia operates an ‘Other Conventional Fixed Peg 
Arrangement’. Here, although there is not the same commitment to keep the parity 
irrevocably, there is a concerted effort to maintain the within narrow margins of less 
than ±1% around the central rate.  
Joseph-Khoury and Wihlborg (2006) suggest that, in effect, by forming a 
currency board, Estonia has outsourced monetary policy. Moreover, the scale of 
dependence of domestic retail banking on Swedish banks is made evident in Table 1.1 
of the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (2009). By permitting the takeover of 
so much of its domestic banks, it also outsourced its lender of last resort function to 
foreign authorities. The outsourcing of both bred confidence in the banking system 
and the money. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have similar banking structures. 
Over the period 2006-2008, the Baltic States faced significant problems. Price 
and wage inflation and interest rates were beyond the acceptable thresholds of the 
convergence criteria. Through lax lending by Scandinavian banks, a credit growth rate 
of an average annual rate of at least 27% (IMF, 2009) resulted in property price 
bubbles that burst at the end of the period studied. For example, the Latvian house 
price-net earnings ratio peaked in the second quarter of 2007 and average rents 
peaked in August 2007 (Latvijas Banka, 2009). Latvia appeared to be in a worse 
position than the other two in the way the economy was overheating.  
 
3. Contagion 
 
Modern portfolio theory advocates that investors should manage risk through 
diversification across a variety of assets (Cuthbertson, 1996). Dispersing investments 
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across two assets that are not perfectly correlated should reduce risk exposure. 
Diversification in asset types is based on the view that each is a function of a 
distinctive group of variables (Hoesli et al., 1997). If a shock has a contagious impact, 
the markets behave more similarly after the shock, which implies that contagion 
captures a change in the data generating processes: it suggests that the forces behind 
the price movements are less distinct as a result of the shock. Thus, contagion 
undermines the basis of portfolio management.  
Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) present six definitions of contagions; the fifth, 
(shift) contagion, is relevant for the approach taken here. Shift contagion entails a 
change in the transmission of financial activity between markets. The change can 
include intensification as well as structural change in the rate or timing of flows or 
interactions. Commonly, the term contagion is associated with the relationships 
between portfolio assets being intensified. By contrast, intensification could herald 
greater market integration, so strengthening regional economic associations. Thus, 
intensification could be a favourable or an unfavourable change.  
 
4. Literature Review 
 
Central European economic indicators have been examined for contagion, some with 
adopting the inception of the European single currency as a marker. Using stock 
market indices of Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, the S&P500 and 
the Dax, pre- and post-EMU creation, Syriopoulos  (2007) finds that the emerging 
markets appear to be no more strongly linked to those of the US and Germany. He 
finds one cointegrating vector in both periods suggesting that there is no strengthening 
of links in the long run. Using residuals from error correction models in a correlation 
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test, Yang et al. (2003) find that EMU led to greater integration of larger stock 
markets across Europe that adopted the Euro. Innovation accounting indicates that 
smaller and non-Eurozone (UK’s) stock exchanges appear less well integrated. No 
clear pattern emerges of integration or disintegration between the US stock market 
and the other eleven considered. Examining the same phenomenon as Yang et al. but 
using a GARCH-M model, Westermann (2004) finds that, following EMU, daily 
lead-lag relations between France, Germany and Italy disappeared, but the US market 
still played a significant leading role. The latter two proffer similar conclusions: EMU 
precipitated greater market integration. 
 In their study of Central European stock markets, Serwa and Bohl (2005) find 
that Central European stock markets are no more likely to be subject to contagion than 
western stock markets over the 1997-2002 period and that the Central European stock 
markets exhibit interdependence rather than contagion. 
Using a bivariate cointegration approach, Maneschiöld (2006) finds that the 
Baltic States’ stock markets are integrated with those of the Germany, France and the 
UK over the period 1996-2005. Interestingly, the Baltic States themselves are not 
integrated in the long run. There are short run links from European and US markets to 
the three states but not the converse. From a portfolio diversification perspective, 
Maneschiöld advocates seeking longer, rather than shorter-term benefits. 
In an examination of the British term structure of interest rates, Hughes-Hallett 
and Richter (2004) use spectral analysis. Estimating gain and phase spectra of British 
10 and 2 year bond yields for before the episode, they compared the ‘profiles’ or 
patterns of the spectra with those during and after the ERM crisis of 1992/3. Gain is 
akin to a regression coefficient and a phase value, like a lag, reveals a delay, but they 
are estimated for each frequency. The initial consequences of the crisis are revealed 
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by portions of the profiles falling outside the confidence band from the pre-crisis 
coefficients at lower frequencies. Gain altered notably over the first two months but 
reverts to the pre-crisis pattern by 1998. The phase change entails smaller delays. In 
the initial period, delays between long and short-term interest rates at the longer 
cycles vary between a fraction of a day to over a week. Following the ERM ejection, 
the profile becomes flatter but remains inside the lower bound. However, from 1993 
the profile at the low end falls outside the confidence interval of the pre-shock band 
and becomes flat, i.e. no-delay turns out to be persistent. This is symptomatic of a 
structural change, consistent with contagion. They conclude that Sterling’s ejection 
from the ERM resulted in changes in risk premia or liquidity preference. Underlying 
relationships, which determine the effectiveness of monetary policy, as revealed by 
gain, were relatively stable. 
Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003) explore output fluctuations and shock 
persistence using spectral and other methods. They examine growth rates of real GDP 
spectra of 53 countries. Normalising the spectral estimates and creating output 
variations associated with short, business and long cycles, they consider peaks in the 
spectrum relative to the long run value (i.e. at zero frequency). Using the lower bound 
of the former relative to the upper bound of the latter, they reveal significant peaks in 
the spectrum that are used to classify nations. 
A most unusual approach due to Smith (2001) and reviewed by Wang (2003b) 
entails a cross-spectral analysis of the impact of the 1987 crash on equity markets of 
the Pacific Rim. Using coherence among pairs of asset markets for portfolio 
construction purposes, Smith reveals intensification through increased coherence. He 
seeks to reveal changes in the relationships amongst five markets across North 
America and South East Asia for portfolio diversification proposes. Cross-spectra are 
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estimated over a set of frequencies, not just one, so finding heightened coherence at 
one frequency may be coloured by conflicting evidence at another. He uses 
Wilcoxon’s Z-statistic to assess whether the two spectra of coherence are drawn from 
the same population. 
The Australia and US phase spectrum has generally a positive linear trajectory 
with extreme values of zero and π, suggesting a delay of one period (day) of the 
former behind the latter, which could reflects time zones. Wang (2003a) points out 
that the time domain analysis of common cycles could not accommodate the 
complexity of cycles that are not in a similar phase at higher frequencies. 
Asimakopoulos et al. (2000) investigate leads/lags and integration among 
equity markets. The US market exhibits high coherence with European ones at low, 
but not high frequencies. Also, they find 11 to 13 day cycles in the spectral densities 
of all four indices. 
 
5. Methodology: Spectral Analysis 
 
Spectral and cross-spectral analysis can be seen as means of revealing variance and 
co-variance, but in the frequency domain. As no prior model is assumed, Kendall and 
Ord (1990) view the approach as non-parametric. If the power spectrum is large at 
frequency ωj, it indicates that variable X has a concentration of variance at that 
periodicy. The equivalent of the coefficient of determination in cross-spectral analysis 
is coherence (squared coherency). If the coherence is large at frequency ωj, it 
indicates that variables X and Y have a concentration of co-variation at that periodicy. 
Displayed in figures 2 to 4 are three pairs of power spectra one for the pre and one for 
the post-event eras. Although the Litas forms part of the analysis, its profile tends to 
 8 
duplicate that of the Kroon, so for brevity’s sake will not be reporduced. Each of the 
Baltic currencies is paired with the Euro to produce cross spectra. In each case, the 
exercise is repeated, once using pre- currency data and one post-shock era. There is 
then a consideration of whether the two cross-spectra are drawn from the same 
sample. This corresponds to a null of no change against an alternative of contagion 
(weaker or stronger links). When considering this null, Smith (2001) uses Wilcoxon’s 
Z-statistic. Conover (1971) states that the distributions should be symmetrical. If not, 
the less powerful Sign test can be used.  
The phase value presents a notion of lead-time (if positive) of the first series X 
over the second Y at (angular) frequency ωj. The confidence interval for a phase value 
is determined by the corresponding level of coherence. The phase values are 
converted into the time domain measures (known as tau = τ), so that any lead or lag is 
displayed in fractions of a day.  
Pericoli and Sbracia’s (2003) ‘shift contagion’ focuses on changes in structure. 
Structural change can include transformations in the configuration of delays or speed 
of adjustment as well as a strengthening of links. An acceleration of the transmission 
mechanism, reducing the delay between impulse and reaction, implies a structural 
change in asset markets interaction. Faster shock transfer is posited to be reflected in 
smaller values/fewer significant values of tau or a greater weight of emphasis on the 
higher frequencies. Pericoli and Sbracia also ask over which frequency should a crisis 
in one country trigger turbulence for another? It is possibly that there is a significant 
lag. It is far from obvious that changes should lead to higher correlation at daily 
weekly or monthly cycles. Indeed, they may lead to a lowering of correlation over 
some of these frequencies. 
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5.1 A Well Functioning Fixed Exchange Rate 
 
Using a non-Euro common base, such as the Dollar, comparisons are made directly 
between the Kroon, Lat and Litas. If the fixed exchange rate is working effectively, 
there should be no difference between the long run dynamics of the Euro and the 
currencies of the Baltic States. There will be some delay between movements in one 
currency and adjustments in another, which should be more evident in the short run.  
A currency crisis does not always emerge from a financial crisis (Kaminsky et 
al., 2003; Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003). In a pegged exchange rate sense, financial 
contagion, as a notion of dislocated relations, would be reflected in a greater 
dissimilarity of movement and longer deviations from central rate, associated with 
intense pressure on the central bank to maintain parity. One would anticipate the 
shock could provoke a lower level of confluence among a pair of currencies as 
measured against a third. The arbitrage process would appear more imperfect.  
Given Van Poeck et al. (2007) assertion that membership of the ERMII can 
increase the vulnerability to a speculative attack, the Baltic States’ currencies should, 
following a shock:  
1. exhibit a notable change (fall)  in the co-movement with the Euro; 
2. exhibit a disruption to money flow patterns; and 
3. as the Latvian currency operates in less hard peg regime, it should exhibit lower 
co-movements and more disruption than the other two currencies against the Euro, 
particularly after the shock.  
Exchange rates are commonly seen as following a random walk (Cuaresma and 
Hlouskova, 2005). Reflecting a perfectly maintained peg, coherence, one would 
anticipate, at low frequencies, would be close to 1. At high frequencies, reflecting 
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turbulence and arbitrage or central bank intervention, coherence would be lower than 
found at the lower frequencies.  
Non-zero tau, if not indicating a delay across the spectrum may, it is proposed, 
reflects spot market foreign exchange periodicies, such as money market contract 
periods. Consequently, leads in currency movements should reflect capital flows from 
one market to another for short-term investment or possibly speculative purposes, 
which, with a delay, are subsequently sterilised by compensating changes in central 
bank reserves or other currency movements by multinational banks.  
 
6. Data 
 
Data for the Estonian Kroon, Latvian Lat and the Lithuanian Litas and the Euro, all 
measured in US Dollars, are taken from the Bank of England’s statistics website for 
the period 9 8 06 to 8 8 08. This covers 507 daily foreign exchange spot rates (FX 
rate), with the shock or event occurring at the mid point on the 9th August 07. Plots of 
the logged series over two years are displayed in Figure 1. Using two scales to reflect 
the different nominal values, there may be a (significant) slow drift downwards in the 
levels of the data. It appears as if there is notably more variation in the right-hand 
scaled currencies. This is misleading: they are tightly bound together, reflecting the 
ERMII peg. 
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Figure 1. Logged Exchange Rates against the US Dollar. 
 
 
Despite being measured in Dollars, the Euro/Kroon and the Euro/Litas follow a linear 
relationship. In other words, any adjustments between the currencies occur so quickly 
that the fixed exchange rate is maintained almost always within a day. The Euro/Lat 
relation is not so tight.  
 
6.1 Structural Break 
 
One can utilise Chow tests to consider the hypothesis of a structural break. There are 
two variants that are commonly used. The coefficient stability test, the Chow test I, 
reveals whether the parameters estimated over the benign period continue are 
appropriate over the crisis period. Chow test II or the predictive failure test assesses 
whether the estimated parameters in the benign and crisis periods are significantly 
different from each other. Violation of either the coefficient stability or predictive 
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failure test may be interpreted as evidence of a structural break in the data. The tests 
are predicated on homoscedastic errors. In (1) there is a AR(2) model of the (logged) 
Euro time series in the benign period with  t - ratios in brackets. 
 
21 023388.97122.0017418.   ttt LEuroLEuroLEuro     (1) 
                  ( -.76612)    (15.2292)        (.36487) 
 
Diagnostic tests 
 
  983.2 R  
Serial Correlation CHSQ(    1)=    .52755[.468] Functional Form    CHSQ(   1)=     .52755[.468] 
ARCH (OLS) CHSQ(    2)=    .56159[.755] Heteroscedasticity CHSQ(   1)=     2.0280[.154] 
Predictive Failure CHSQ(253)=617.0179[.000]* Chow Test I CHSQ(   3)=     3.8986[.273] 
Normality CHSQ(    2)=    .79371[.672]   
 
The diagnostic tests suggest that the model is well specified and the coefficients 
indicate that the model could be re-expressed as a difference stationary variable: 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, as a random walk. Predictive Failure 
test indicates that there is at least one structural break over the two-year period. 
Following the above, the (logged) data from the four FX rate series are 
considered for unit root.1 From these, it is concluded that the data is difference 
stationary. 
 As displayed in Table 1, the standard deviation for each logged differenced 
series is greater after August 9th 2007 compared with before, which is consistent with 
the presumption that a crisis causes turbulence. This is confirmed by Levene’s 
homogeneity of variance test. The table also shows that, using a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, there is no sub-sample where there is significant deviance from the null 
of normality. Coefficients of skewness and kurtosis for the Kroon and Litas are 
indistinguishable. The skewness of the Lat is higher than those of the others, but not 
                                               
1 The test for unit root entailed the Perron (1989) modified Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
expression,    
p
j tjtjtt
xDttxDx
110110
)1(  t ~ iid(0, ²) 
where p is the order of the lag polynomial set to one. D, the dummy, takes a value of 0 before and 1 
after the crisis began. If the coefficients on D are zero, the expression reverts to the ADF test. 
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significantly so. Kurtosis is positive and significant before the event but not after. 
Generally, the coefficients in Table 1 suggest the Kroon and Litas are 
indistinguishable from the Euro, whereas the Lat has slightly differences. 
The row labelled Standard Deviation shows that the turbulence suffered by the 
three currencies is very similar to that of the Euro. Using an F-test, there are no 
statistical differences between any pairs. The ones where the contrasts are likely to be 
the most pronounced (Euro-Lat) are not significant (pre-event [p = 0.276], post-event 
[p = 0.388]). The Chow tests are predicated on common variance. It could be that, as 
posited with a crisis but with a fixed exchange rate, the structural change concerns 
volatility.  
Table 1: Exchange Rate Descriptives  
Estonian Kroon Lithuanian Litas Latvia Lat Euro  
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Normality (p-value) .419 .248 .415 .243 .479 .338 .412 .310 
Standard Deviation .0035287 .0054296 .0035284 .0054333 .0036640 .0055315 .0035292 .0054335 
Levene test (p-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 
Skewness (se = .153) .042 .265 .041 .266 .206 .242 .048 .263 
Kurtosis (se = .305) .253 .317 .250 .319 .698 .195 .259 .308 
 
 
 
6.2 Power Spectra 
 
As comparisons of spectra are based on particular frequencies, there is a problem with 
synchronising dates. National holidays and leap years can disrupt the synchronicity. 
To address this, the Bank of England data is extended so that there is an exchange rate 
value for every weekday, whether it is a working day or not. This is achieved by using 
the most recent rate in the levels of the data before the non-trading weekday. The two 
sets of 256 days are taken from Thursday 9th August 07 and the equivalent Thursday 
in 2006.  
 For the power spectra, coherence and phase, corresponding to 256 to 2 periods 
(days), coefficients for 128 (angular) frequencies (f), will be estimated. These range 
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from 0.00390625 to 0.5 radians (a radian ωj = 2fj). In addition, there is the long run 
coefficient at zero frequency. The general pattern for all four power spectra in Figures 
2-4 is that, at all frequencies, the post-event values are above the corresponding ones 
for before. As well as the spectra, confidence intervals are displayed. One question to 
address is whether the changes are significant. Hughes-Hallett and Richter (2004) and 
Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003), in combination, proffer two alternatives methods to 
address this. One could consider whether the values of the spectrum after the event 
fall outside the confidence interval for the upper confidence interval boundary of the 
spectrum values before the event. Alternatively, one could examine whether the lower 
band of the after-event spectrum is above the upper bound of the before-event 
spectrum. The latter is a more onerous test to pass. When using the confidence 
intervals (con. int), outside of a few cases around 6 and 2½-day cycles, the after-event 
profile is greater than before. This upward shift reflects greater volatility in exchange 
rates across the spectrum. 
If attention is shifted to the variance at each frequency for the Euro, both pre- 
and post-event have a peak around 0.1 radians. For the pre-event profile, it is at a 
cycle of 7.8 days, whereas the after-event profile, it is 9.5 days, i.e. 2 weeks. After 
about 0.17 radians there appears to be a notable change in the profiles. Between this 
point and around 0.4 radians, there is an inverted U-shape in the post and a flat or 
even a U-shape in the pre-event profile. After 0.4 radians there again appears to be a 
mirroring of the profiles. In other words, following the event, the volatility associated 
with exchange rates shifted between cycles. In particular, there is a greater 
concentration in certain bands. It is notable how higher frequencies are more strongly 
featured. This can be interpreted as a shift towards shorter-term trading, including 
speculation. Hughes-Hallett and Richter (2004) find that, following the ERM crisis, 
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there is also a shift towards the higher frequencies in the gain spectrum. In a period of 
information paucity, traders shifting to a shorter-term horizon may be appropriate. 
There are 37 power spectrum values before, and 25 after, the start of the crisis 
that fall outside the confidence interval for the long run coefficient, all but two are 
below the lower bounds. This suggests that there is some variation in the distribution 
of the variance across the cycles and it is not white noise. 
By eye, the profiles of the four countries’ exchange rate power spectra are 
similar both before and after the event. Although not a recognised measure, a 
Spearman’s rank correlation of the Euro power spectrum before the event with those 
of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia produce values of 0.8, 0.998 and 0.999. The 
corresponding figures are 0.92, 0.99 and 1 for the post-event era. In other words, 
despite greater volatility, the event led to more similar profiles. These figures should 
correspond to very high coherence coefficients, with increasing values after the event. 
The pre- and post-event spectra for the Euro are correlated, but negatively (–0.42) 
which implies a structural change. 
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Figure 2. Power Spectrum – Euro Before and After the Event, with Confidence 
Intervals 
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Figure 3. Power Spectrum – Estonian Kroon Before and After the Event, with 
Confidence Intervals 
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Figure 4. Power Spectrum – Latvian Lat Before and After the Event, with Confidence 
Intervals 
 
 
7. Cross Spectral Results  
 
Figures 5 and 6 display coherence spectra. They suggest higher coherence levels 
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following the event in the higher frequencies. Both the Kroon and the Litas are 
currency board-controlled exchange rates with a ‘zero’ fluctuation. There is a clear 
divide between the Lat, in Figure 6, and the other two: the coherence values of the Lat 
are lower than those of the Kroon and Litas. The Lat fluctuates within a 2% band, 
which, if utilised, explains the lower level of coherence. Most importantly, the post-
event coherence profile appears above the pre-event, indicating a closer shadowing of 
the Euro after the event. 
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Figure 5. Coherence - Euro/Kroon Before and After the Event, with Confidence 
Intervals  
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Figure 6. Coherence - Euro/Lat Before and After the Event, with Confidence Intervals 
 
 
 
Using confidence intervals in a similar manner to the power spectra, in the case of 
Latvia, there are 59 (110) frequencies where the after-event coherence confidence 
interval is above the upper interval for the pre-event coherence. With Lithuania and 
Estonia, the corresponding numbers are 10/63 and 31/97. These suggest an increase in 
coherence for Latvia but the evidence for Lithuania and Estonia is not as supportive. 
The mean, median, standard deviation and maximum value are reported in 
Table 2. Examining the coherence levels of the 129 frequencies, the means and 
medians exhibit the same direction of change. The mean coherence value of 0.889 for 
the Euro and the Lat pairing before the event rose to 0.958 in Table 2. The median 
value rose by a similar margin from 0.901 to 0.958. The coherence values after the 
event are distributed normally ([p = .283]) but not before ([p = .002] respectively). 
The Wilcoxon Z-statistic is predicated on a symmetric distribution, so a test of skew is 
included. It revealed that the distribution of coherence values is not symmetrical. As 
such, rather than using a Wilcoxon test, a Sign test is appropriate. As it turns out, the 
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results are not distinguishable. From observing the pattern of coherence for all three 
pairs, the null of being drawn from a common pool is rejected [p <.000]: coherence is 
greater after the event for all three pairings. Rather than declining, the Baltic States’ 
currencies mirror the Euro more closely. These results are less ambiguous than the 
considerations using confidence intervals, and they are in accord with analyses using 
the power spectra. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Sign and Wilcoxon Test for Coherence 
  Mean Std. Deviation Median Max Normality 
Skew 
(se=.213) Wilcoxon Sign 
Euro/Lat-a .956948 .013949 .9580 .981625 .403 -.187 
Euro/Lat-b .889334 .045070 .9073 .948389 .000 -.968 
.000 .000 
Euro/Litas-a .999842 .000105 .9998 .999997 .012 .033 
Euro/Litas-b .999714 .000227 .9997 .999995 .096 -.753 
.000 .000 
Euro/Estonia-a .999892 .000078 .9999 .999999 .012 -.180 
Euro/Estonia-b .999769 .000169 .9998 .999998 .096 -.355 
.000 .000 
a: After the Event b: Before the Event  
 
 
 
Rather than the hypothesised lower values suggestive of pressure on the maintenance 
of the peg, the coherence evidence appears to support De Grauwe and Grimaldi’s 
argument that the likelihood of an exchange rate crisis is lower because of the self-
imposed costs of reneging on the ERMII commitment. Depending on the method, all 
three ERMII members exhibit either no or an increase of coherence, which is 
favourable intensification. Given the high values, the confidence interval approach 
may not show a clear change. However, with Latvia, there is a stronger case for 
concluding an increase in coherence. This country, with ‘worse’ characteristics and a 
‘softer’ peg, appears not to have been precluded from this shift, which does not 
sustain Fischer’s concerns.  
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7.1 Phase Spectra 
 
For a given phase, PXY(ωj), a corresponding time shift in the time domain is tau (τ). 
Rather than presenting the phase value, tau is displayed, so the scaling on the ordinate 
is in units of time. The symbol ‘+’ indicates a tau value before the event and ‘–’ 
signifies tau after the event at a particular frequency that is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. The two symbols should be laid on one another where there 
is no [structural] change.  
 There are significant frequency groups for both pre- and post-event periods 
where similar leads and lags are evident. Periodicies that could reflect money market 
contract term, such as two months, one month, two weeks and a week emerge. As 
these are short and standard periods that do not indicate a delay across the spectrum, 
they could reflect timings and directions of money flows. For example, after the 
event, the Euro leads the Litas by one minute at 0.35, 0.2 and 0.1 radians (just under 3 
days, a week and two weeks) but the Euro lags the Litas by 2 to 3 minutes at less than 
0.05 radians (a month). With all three, there are frequency groups where the Euro 
leads and then lags the Baltic currencies. This could be interpreted as money 
movements from, for example, Lithuania to Europe on a shorter-term basis than it 
flows the other way. 
 Another dimension of contagion is captured by the phase value. Hughes-
Hallett and Richter (2004) did not make much of the change in the phase spectra other 
than to point out that, following the crisis, it became flatter persistently. Phase for the 
Euro/Kroon (in Figure 7) and Euro/Litas present similar profiles. Rather than perfect 
alignment, they show up to 3-minute delays in exchange rate variations. This suggests 
some currency-sensitive, possibly automated, processes are in place to sterilise 
discordant currency flows. By contrast, phase for the Euro/Lat in Figure 8 suggests 
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the adjustment takes place within 2 hours; quicker at higher frequencies in both the 
pre and post periods. The slower adjustment is in keeping with the lower coherence 
and use of a broader, 2% band.  
  The event led to money markets drying-up in London, raising short-term 
interest rates to very high levels, precipitating the collapse of Northern Rock in the 
UK and central banks became, for a time, the lenders of only resort. The Kroon and 
Litas have similar lag profiles for both the pre- and post-event eras. Strangely, the 
phase spectra appear to be inverted so at frequencies where there was a lead before 
the event, there is a lag after but for the same delay. The crisis appears to have 
switched the directions of money flows, which could reflect a change in policy of the 
Swedish banks and a repatriation of funds from the various local financial markets 
(Levy-Yeyati, 2009; Brixiova et al., 2009). Clearly, this is a possible conduit of 
contagion. The ownership structure of the Baltic States’ commercial banks, could also 
explain the similarity of structural change in the flow of funds across Lithuania and 
Estonia. However, the shift toward longer periodicies in Latvia is not consistent with 
this. Perhaps the shift towards longer-term maturities is appropriate were short-term 
funding is deemed non-functioning or unreliable. Brixiova et al. (2009) find that 
short-term deposits supported loans in the Baltic States. A re-evaluation of this 
practice could shift them to longer-dated, or other sources of finance. Nevertheless, 
there has been a structural change and some evidence of an increase in coherence in 
all three cases. It is possible that the intensification is based on a net repatriation of 
funds to banks domiciled in Scandinavia, suggesting the contagion is something not 
so favourable. 
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Figure 7. Tau - Euro/Kroon.  
(+) indicates that, at frequency f, the Euro leads the Kroon by  days in the era Before 
the Event. (-) indicates the corresponding concept but After the Event. 
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Figure 8. Tau - Euro/Lat 
(+) indicates that, at frequency f, the Euro leads the Lat by  days in the era Before the 
Event. (-) indicates the corresponding concept but After the Event. 
 
 
 
 23 
What contagion represents, in a sense, is a necessary condition for an optimal 
currency union; that is, an asymmetric shock is dispersed to member countries (De 
Grauwe, 2003). Once they have acceded, the banking links with other Eurozone 
countries could be viewed as dimensions of integration. Thus, as portents, these 
results may be consistent with Yang et al. (2003) and Westermann (2004) in that 
preparation for EMU precipitates greater market integration. So, for ERMII, 
favourable foreign currency contagion bodes well for accession and subsequent 
membership. Against Fischer’s (2001) expectation, the Lat, as a softer peg, was not 
adversely affected relative to the others. However, it could be that an unfavourable 
repatriation of bank loans from the host to the home country would be, in part, 
responsible for the intensification of co-movement, so this signal could be open to a 
different interpretation. Moreover, as the banking links are actually with a non-
Eurozone member, accession of the Baltic States technically exposes the currency 
area to a greater likelihood of contagion from turbulence in Sweden, and that this 
could act asymmetrically within the Eurozone through these three countries. As the 
period of study ends before the Baltic States begin to contract significantly this could 
become evident in later data sets. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
As ERMII members, the three Baltic States maintained a fixed exchange rate with the 
Euro over 2006-8 but that continuity disguises structural change. Rather than causing 
a divergence between the Euro and the Baltic currencies, coherence indicates that, in a 
more turbulent period, the event precipitated a closer shadowing of the Euro, which is 
a sign of success for ERMII countries, supporting De Grauwe and Grimaldi and at 
odds with Van Poeck et al.. The exchange rate regime does influence coherence. The 
 24 
Lat, with its 2% range around a peg, exhibits lower coherence levels and greater phase 
values than the Litas or the Kroon. But the less strict regime did not affect the 
intensification of co-movement.  
Phase reveals a difference between the Lat and the other two, with time lags of 
possibly an hour or so. By contrast, with tighter commitments to the Euro, the Kroon 
and the Litas exhibit time delays of a matter of minutes. Consistent with tightly 
managed exchange rates, all three respond within a day. The structure of leads and 
lags altered for the Lat by maintaining the same delays but at lower frequencies. The 
other two exhibited a major change in that there is a switch from leading to lagging at 
major frequency groups. These periodicies are presumed to reflect wholesale money 
market maturity periods. Moreover, the structural change could be related to the 
drying-up these of money markets. Given the international ownership structure of the 
Baltic States’ commercial banking sectors, cross-boarder movement of funds could be 
regimented. The phase spectra inverts suggest the event led to a change in the flow, 
and possibly a repatriation of funds. Overall, there is evidence of a structural change 
in co-movements, so shift contagion is found: the event on the 9th August 2007 
constitutes a contagion-inducting shock.  
Currency co-movement may not be a definitive guide to whether fulfilling 
EMU convergence criteria prepares a country for Euro accession. The drivers of co-
movements should be a focus of investigation. If intensification is based on structural 
bonds, such as trade, then, in a pre-EMU period, they could prove problematic for 
economic management, but post-accession, they would form some of the necessary 
building blocks of an optimal currency union. However, if intensification is based on 
a repatriation of funds to Scandinavian banks, this is less than a favourable shift. In 
the post-accession era, although one driver, the fear of devaluation, will be expunged, 
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the structural link between the Baltic States and Sweden could be the source of 
asymmetric shocks and constitute a conduit of contagion between the Euro and 
Krona. 
More work should be undertaken to clarify the periodicies in money markets 
and their link to the spectra discussed. Moreover, there may be other discontinuities 
that affect the co-movement of currencies not considered. What is featured here 
concerns only one ‘known’ one. Spectral analysis as applied here has limitations. The 
analysis is on a bivariate as opposed to multivariate basis. Jenkins and Watts (1968) 
show partial coherence and partial phase formulae that can be applied to control for 
the impact of, say, the Euro. The Euro could mask interactions between the Baltic 
currencies and others, such as the Swedish Krona. Further work could distil Krona 
from Euro-based contagious effects. 
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Appendix 
 
The theoretical spectrum divides up a time series into a set of components that are 
orthogonal. It reveals the relative power at each frequency corresponding to the 
variance at each periodicy, so that sharp peaks denote a high concentration. Thus, 
auto-covariance in the time domain can be represented as a spectrum in the frequency 
domain. The spectrum is symmetrical in the range –π ≤ ω ≤ π, where frequency ω is 
measured in radians. The auto-covariance  ))(()(    tktx xxEk  in the time 
domain is represented as 

 ik
k
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1)(  in the frequency domain. This is 
transformed into 
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 . The sample periodogram is 
estimated as, 
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 . The periodogram is not a 
consistent estimator of the theoretical spectrum: the periodogram is not well behaved 
as the number of frequencies is a function of T but variance is not. Smoothing is 
required as the sample is not a consistent estimator of the theoretical spectrum. There 
is a trade-off between stability and fidelity. The greater the smoothing (a greater M, 
the ‘lag window’), the smaller the variance but also the greater the bias and distortion 
of the theoretical spectrum. The following numbers are used to calculate the 
confidence intervals: T = 256 (just below the number of weekdays in a year) and M = 
7. The number of degrees of freedom (v) for a Parzen lag window is given as 3.71T/M 
or 135. 
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The estimated coherence is given by 
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   where the smoothed 
sample periodogram, or sample power spectrum of X is )(ˆ jXs  and )(ˆ jXYs   is the 
sample cross-spectrum.  
The Phase value gives a notion of leading (if positive) of the first series X over 
the second Y at frequency ωj. The estimated phase value 
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where the estimated cospectrum is )(ˆ jXYc   and the estimated quadrature spectrum is 
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  . Time shift τj = PXY(ωj)/2πfj 
(Harvey, 1993). 
  
 
 
 
